Voting period: 7 days
Categories:
Social Proposal
Request for Action
Constitution Amendment
Abstract:
This proposal calls for the removal of Snorlax as the Steward of Governance (SoG) and the immediate appointment of Theo Wayne as interim SoG until new elections can be held. While this decision is regrettable, it is necessary to ensure the long-term success and integrity of the DAO and Tezos Domains. A consistent pattern of fundamental governance failures, overreach, and resistance to decentralization has compromised the DAO’s ability to function fairly and democratically under Snorlax’s stewardship.
The role of the SoG is crucial for maintaining impartiality, fostering collaboration, and advancing the DAO’s mission of decentralized governance. Unfortunately, Snorlax’s actions have repeatedly undermined these principles, creating an environment of mistrust and inefficiency. This proposal seeks to reset the governance trajectory by implementing an interim solution, formalizing the SoG role through a DAO-ratified framework, and organizing a transparent election to select a new steward who can lead with integrity, professionalism, and an unwavering commitment to the DAO’s foundational values.
Rationale:
Regrettably, this proposal seeks the removal of Snorlax as Steward of Governance (SoG) due to a consistent pattern of behavior and decisions that undermine the DAO’s foundational principles of self-amending governance, objectivity, decentralization, and impartiality. While his efforts may have been well-intentioned, they have revealed critical misunderstandings of governance, resistance to decentralization, and a lack of the professionalism required for this role.
The Steward of Governance must act as a neutral facilitator, ensuring fair processes while enabling the DAO to adapt and evolve. Instead, Snorlax has conflated governance principles, dismissed valid critiques as personal attacks, and resisted efforts to decentralize power. His actions have demonstrated partiality, with decision-making aligned to specific delegates, and unilateral overreach in areas that should require DAO consensus. Furthermore, his inconsistency in applying governance logic and refusal to constructively engage with criticism reflect a troubling inability to uphold the role’s demands.
Replacing Snorlax is not a decision made lightly, but it is essential for the DAO’s long-term functionality, trust, and integrity. A new Steward of Governance must embody impartiality, professionalism, and a commitment to decentralization to lead the DAO toward a more cohesive and collaborative future.
Details:
1. Fundamental Misapplication of Self-Amending Governance
Snorlax has consistently demonstrated a flawed and dangerous interpretation of self-amending governance, which is the cornerstone of this DAO. He actively obstructed motions for a stop vote on P-014, claiming that once a proposal is passed, it must be executed without amendment or reconsideration. This rigid and erroneous stance disregards the DAO’s foundational ability—and obligation—to revisit and adapt decisions as circumstances evolve, as evidenced by the DAO’s concurrent stop vote on P-016.
Such actions not only reveal a failure to respect the DAO’s self-amending nature but also a troubling inconsistency in his application of governance principles. By blocking mechanisms intended to empower the DAO to self-correct, Snorlax has undermined one of the most critical features of decentralized governance.
2. Failure to Uphold Governance Standards
A core responsibility of the Steward of Governance is to ensure clarity, collaboration, and adherence to governance standards. Snorlax has repeatedly failed to meet this responsibility, creating unnecessary ambiguity and setting harmful precedents. For instance, he relied on informal comments made in proposal threads to justify critical decisions, such as the December 3rd execution date for P-014. This reliance on informal mechanisms undermines the DAO’s structured voting process and diminishes trust in its governance framework. Proposals must be governed by their formal text and voting outcomes, not by post-hoc interpretations or informal remarks.
When challenged on governance matters, Snorlax has frequently shifted his reasoning, introducing confusion rather than resolving it. His inconsistent stances on key issues, such as the P-014 execution timeline, demonstrate a lack of commitment to ensuring procedural clarity. By negligently blurring the lines between formal and informal governance processes, Snorlax has eroded confidence in the DAO’s decision-making and weakened the procedural integrity that underpins fair and accountable governance. These failures have broader implications for the DAO, undermining trust among delegates and threatening its ability to function effectively.
3. Conflating Governance Votes with Executive Actions
Snorlax has consistently conflated the act of proposing a governance vote with unilateral executive action. For instance, he framed efforts to put a stop vote for P-014 to the DAO as an attempt to unilaterally overturn the proposal—ignoring that it would have been the DAO, not any individual, deciding whether or not to amend or stop it.
This equivocation underscores his misunderstanding of his role. By blocking votes on P-014 and other issues, he precluded the DAO’s ability to deliberate and decide, effectively exercising the very kind of unilateral authority he falsely accused others of seeking. This pattern of behavior is incompatible with the principles of democratic governance.
4. Resistance to Decentralization and Overreach
The Steward of Governance is tasked with fostering decentralization, yet Snorlax has reinforced centralizing elements that were over-endowed to his position during the DAO’s earliest stages. His implication that the DAO’s decentralization could not suffer from his overreach by mere virtue of it being a ‘decentralized autonomous organization’ by name and definition, reveals a flawed understanding of decentralization as an ongoing process.
Instead of promoting community-driven decision-making, Snorlax has unilaterally drafted governance reforms, such as his recent proposal for biannual elections, which directly impact his own role. Governance changes of this magnitude must originate from the DAO, not the SoG.
5. Lack of Professionalism and Temperament
Rather than addressing criticisms constructively, Snorlax has frequently treated feedback as personal attacks, dismissing valid governance critiques as “griefing” or “obsessing.” This approach stifles meaningful dialogue and creates a hostile environment for collaboration. A Steward of Governance must embody professionalism, maintaining focus on the DAO’s goals rather than framing legitimate concerns as personal affronts. Snorlax’s responses have often reflected defensiveness and dismissiveness, which are inappropriate for a leadership role requiring impartiality and diplomacy.
These inflammatory remarks trivialized serious governance concerns and undermined the professionalism required for his role. By treating constructive feedback as personal animosity, he obstructed productive dialogue and created an atmosphere of hostility and defensiveness.
The SoG role requires the ability to separate personal feelings from governance matters and to engage with diverse viewpoints constructively. Snorlax’s tendency to respond with defensiveness and dismissiveness instead of fostering collaboration demonstrates a lack of the temperament required for effective leadership.
6. Favoritism and Partiality
The Steward of Governance is expected to act as a neutral facilitator, ensuring fair representation of the DAO’s collective interests. However, Snorlax’s actions have demonstrated favoritism, aligning decisions with the preferences of a single influential delegate rather than maintaining impartiality. For example, he initially resisted a stop vote for P-016 but entertained the motion only after this delegate explicitly endorsed it. This alignment raises concerns about his ability to prioritize the DAO’s broader interests over the influence of individual voices.
Even the most capable and well-intentioned participants in governance sometimes need to be reined in and balanced by others to preserve the integrity of the system. If Snorlax is unable or unwilling to uphold this balance—whether due to conscious decisions, unconscious biases, or dependencies—then he cannot fulfill the essential role of an impartial steward. This dynamic undermines the core democratic principles of the DAO and sets a troubling precedent of favoritism, risking the erosion of trust and collaboration within the community.
7. Inconsistencies and Shifting Reasoning
Snorlax has consistently shifted his reasoning to fit predetermined conclusions, even when such reasoning contradicted his prior arguments or applied double standards. For instance, when challenged on the absence of an execution date for P-014, he initially claimed the date was explicitly included in the proposal and, therefore, must be executed without a stop vote. When this claim was disproven, he pivoted to asserting that an in-thread comment established the date—a concerning argument, given that the comment was made over a month after voting had concluded. Finally, he argued that a formalized date was unnecessary altogether, dismissing the importance of explicit governance clarity.
This evolving reasoning was further used to justify blocking a stop vote for P-014, predicated on the notion that it was “too late” to intervene, despite this reasoning itself relying on an “informally decided” date. The pattern of contradictory arguments and reliance on informal processes erodes trust in Snorlax’s leadership and demonstrates a disregard for governance principles.
Additionally, the call for a stop vote on P-014 was made on the same day as a similar call for P-016, with the same “informally decided” date cited for both proposals. This selective application of reasoning underscores a lack of impartiality and consistency in his approach to governance.
8. Resistance to Constructive Criticism and Growth
An SoG’s ability to grow and improve hinges on their willingness to accept constructive criticism. Snorlax has repeatedly framed critique as a problem in itself, focusing on the fact that criticism was given rather than reflecting on its substance. This approach not only stifles meaningful improvement but also signals an unwillingness to evolve in his role.
Moreover, when confronted with valid critiques, Snorlax has frequently appealed to his own authority and experience in DAOs as justification, rather than addressing the specific points raised. This reliance on self-proclaimed expertise neither validates his positions nor addresses the concerns being presented. A Steward of Governance must approach feedback with humility and openness, using it as a foundation for progress, rather than deflecting it or dismissing it outright. This resistance to growth is incompatible with the DAO’s need for adaptable and forward-thinking leadership.
Specification:
Action #1: Immediate Removal of Snorlax as Steward of Governance
Effective immediately, Snorlax will be removed from the position of Steward of Governance (SoG) to address the concerns outlined in the rationale section and to restore the DAO’s adherence to its foundational principles of fairness, impartiality, and self-amending governance.
Action #2: Appointment of Interim Steward of Governance
Theo Wayne, the current Marketing Manager, will be appointed as the interim SoG. This role will be temporary, and Theo Wayne will serve in this capacity while continuing his current responsibilities until a new SoG is elected. His interim position will focus on administrative duties without implementing major governance changes or reforms.
Action #3: Establishment of Qualifications and Responsibilities for the SoG Role
The DAO will draft, discuss, and ratify a comprehensive set of qualifications, responsibilities, and expectations for the Steward of Governance role. This document will ensure that the role is well-defined, aligned with the DAO’s needs, and capable of evolving with the DAO’s growth. These qualifications will prioritize impartiality, decentralization, professionalism, and an understanding of self-amending governance.
Action #4: Call for Public Applications
Once the qualifications and responsibilities are ratified, the DAO will issue a public call for applications for the SoG position. All eligible community members and external candidates will be invited to apply, ensuring transparency and inclusivity in the selection process.
Action #5: Organization and Execution of New Elections
Following the application process, the DAO will organize and hold elections to select a new Steward of Governance. These elections will adhere to the updated qualifications and responsibilities, ensuring the best candidate is chosen to lead the DAO with integrity, professionalism, and adherence to its principles.
