The Tezos Domains DAO constitution gives guidance on Tezos Domains’ purpose and mission, specifies legitimate uses of treasury, and outlines the governance process in principle, including proposal creation and criteria for passing the governance process.
The constitution text follows.
I. The Mission
Tezos Domains’ purpose is to serve as public infrastructure providing human-readable domain names on the Tezos blockchain. Its core mission is to enhance the daily user experience across the Tezos ecosystem and provide a decentralized, accessible platform to the Web3 community. Any fees collected from the users are to encourage fair use of the domain namespace without posing a significant barrier to most users.
II. Use of Treasury
Revenue generated from Tezos Domains user fees and all treasury holdings must solely be directed towards the realization of Tezos Domains’ purpose and core mission. Acceptable fund allocations may include, but are not limited to: development of the core product, maintenance and operating costs, legal expenses, marketing initiatives, and improving integration with other projects in the ecosystem.
III. Governance Process
1 Creation of a proposal
The governance forum provides the exact rules for contents of a proposal and offers ways to communicate and collect feedback on proposals. Proposals that have passed through this process can then be voted on using the governance platform.
2 Proposal acceptance
For a proposal to be accepted by the DAO, it must satisfy the following:
- It must fit in at least one of the categories specified in the section 3.
- A completed voting period specified by the proposal, which has to be at least 7 days and at most 30 days
- It must have passed the vote with minimum 50% of “Yes” votes on the governance platform with “Abstain” votes NOT included in the total tally
- A quorum of 10% of all votes (TEDv) in circulation is required
All voting power and quorum calculations use a snapshot taken at the time of proposal creation on the governance platform.
3 Categories of proposals
A valid proposal has to fit into at least one category.
Social proposal
A social proposal lets the DAO vote on a wide range of questions and issues. These might include but are not limited to requests for new features (as long as they don’t require additional budget) or changes in the governance forum’s structure and rules.
Request for action
A proposal that requests an action, which can be:
- An off-chain action to be taken by the Tezos Domains Foundation, the legal entity representing Tezos Domains. This may involve a transfer of funds from the Tezos Domains Foundation’s fiat account(s), entering into legal agreements, and other actions. The action has to be legal and lawful under the current legislation. The action also cannot prevent the Tezos Domains Foundation from holding enough funds to cover all its binding financial obligations.
- An on-chain action to be taken by the Keyholder multisig. This includes smart contract upgrades, changes to the smart contract configuration, transfers of funds out of the on-chain treasury, and other actions. The governance forum offers more details about the Keyholder multisig, including its purpose and list of current members.
Requests for action that have been accepted and are adhering to Tezos Domains’ purpose, core mission, and use of treasury stated in this constitution, are recommended for execution by the Keyholders and/or the Tezos Domains Foundation.
Constitutional amendment
A proposal that, if accepted, amends the constitution text in a way specified by the proposal.
Any proposal that includes a constitutional amendment needs the following to be accepted (in addition to the standard requirements):
- A minimum voting period of 14 days.
- It must have passed the vote with a majority of two-thirds of “Yes” votes on the governance platform with “Abstain” votes included in the total tally.
- A quorum of 20% of all votes (TEDv) in circulation is required
IV. Emergency Mechanisms
1 Suspension of Quorum Requirement for Constitution Amendments
The governance forum defines a trigger mechanism for the temporary suspension or lowering of the quorum requirement for constitutional amendments.
This emergency mechanism is only available after 60 consecutive days during which no constitution amendment reached the required quorum and during which at least two attempts at voting on a constitution amendment were made and failed to reach the quorum minimum.