Executing P-014 on December 3rd Is a Move That Precludes the DAO’s Right to Decide

General Discussion
1

1. No Formal DAO Approval for December 3rd

This date was never agreed upon by the DAO. A formal vote must occur to establish an execution date. The December 3rd date was unilaterally chosen by a single delegate who authored P-014, which included no inherent timeline for implementation. A ‘stay’ proposal is unnecessary, as no formal launch date was ever established. Allowing the DAO to set this date through a vote is the most transparent and democratic path forward.

Some have claimed that the date was implied through comments made after the vote or through social media announcements. However, these were informal communications that occurred after the voting period had ended and were never included in the proposal itself. It would have been impossible for DAO members to consider or approve a date that was not part of the original proposal.

Allowing the DAO to set this date through a vote is the most transparent and democratic path forward. Relying on informal communications undermines the integrity of governance and risks disenfranchising DAO members.

2. Shifting Market Conditions

P-014 passed in October, during one of Tezos’ lowest points in years in terms of price, transaction volume, and user activity—a moment many would call the market’s ‘bottom.’ Since then, the Tezos ecosystem has experienced a remarkable resurgence, with increasing transaction volumes, rising XTZ prices, and growing user activity. These positive trends provide a unique opportunity to reassess and align our strategies with the current bullish momentum, ensuring we maximize value from the DAO’s most valuable assets, 1D and 2D domains.

3. Reassess for Economic Optimality

Even if the sale of 2D and 1D domains proceeds, it is critical to optimize the timing, structure, and methodology in light of current market conditions. For example, switching from Dutch auctions to English auctions could significantly enhance outcomes by fostering competitive bidding.

Furthermore, selling 1D domains before 2D domains is economically and strategically counterproductive. Sequencing the sales this way defies market logic, as 2D domains should establish a foundation for value and demand ahead of 1D domains. Scheduling the two sales just seven days apart also appears arbitrary, prioritizing convenience for implementors over economic optimization. Such an approach risks severely limiting the DAO’s ability to maximize value from these critical assets. A reassessment is imperative to ensure alignment with sound economic principles and the DAO’s long-term success.

4. Flawed Economic Planning in P-014

P-014 was conceived alongside several other plans during a period of desperation and pessimism. The DAO and Tezos Domains were at a particularly bleak point, and these proposals were drafted with limited input and little confidence. They were designed as experiments to try everything and see what worked, without considering how they might counteract or undermine one another.

The result is a plan lacking economic rigor or foresight. For instance, selling 2D domains just seven days after 1D domains reflects rushed and arbitrary planning, devoid of clear economic logic. With the DAO and Tezos Domains now in a much healthier position, there is an urgent need to revisit and refine P-014 with strategies that reflect the current environment and support long-term growth.

5. Misinterpretation of Governance Principles

Claims that the DAO cannot revisit or amend P-014 are both incorrect and antithetical to the essence of self-amending governance. The DAO was designed to evolve—to create, amend, and revoke its own laws as circumstances require. Blocking amendments undermines these principles and hinders the DAO’s ability to respond to changing conditions. Suggesting that a proposal to amend P-014 is an effort to “overturn the DAO” is misleading and contrary to governance integrity. It is the DAO’s responsibility to remain flexible and adaptive, ensuring decisions reflect the community’s collective will and best interests.

6. Better Plans Already Exist

The DAO’s primary goal must be to generate substantial early revenue to secure the continuity of operations without sacrificing long-term potential. Proceeding with P-014 as is risks locking the DAO into suboptimal outcomes that could inadvertently harm its mid- and long-term prospects. Better alternatives, aligned with current market conditions, have already been proposed but have been obstructed by centralized influences clinging to outdated plans. Allowing the DAO to vote on these alternatives ensures we avoid unnecessary economic harm and align with a forward-looking, community-driven strategy.

2

Accepted for discussion. This isn’t a proposal, so will be removing proposal tag.

I may have to remind you once again, P-014 has been accepted and is in progress to execute on the 3rd of December, whilst this wasn’t a voted for date, this was involved in the plan that the proposal entailed. It would’ve been up to the Core Team and CM to figure out an execution date. There was nothing in the constitution or proposal process involving dates required. Until today when I added timeline requirements in the proposal process.

I’d also like to remind you that you didn’t vote for or against or abstain P-014. Why are you so worked up now about this when you were too busy to even vote?

Moving forward for better understanding, I have added more into the proposal process, so this isn’t ever an issue again.

3

Two questions need to be answered.

  1. To what degree should the DAO “have” to vote exactly?

Obviously we don’t want too little OR to much. There is a fine balance between ensuring the DAOs inclusion, and over burdening the DAO for every little thing. Lets find this right now while we are all here.

  1. What incentives, or consequences are in place for DAO members to step up?

As is, seems like the DAO is just Primate, Snorlax, and Kevin. No one else is even bothering using the voice they have earned here. This is probably the biggest underlying issue on all proposals.

4

1. On the December 3rd Date
While you assert that December 3rd was “involved in the plan” that P-014 entailed, this claim is demonstrably false. The date was neither included in the original proposal nor voted on by the DAO. As you now admit, it was up to the Core Team and CM to determine a date post-vote—a process that is fundamentally outside the scope of formal DAO governance. Decisions like these should not bypass DAO input or be retroactively justified as inherent to a proposal. Governance requires transparency and alignment with the DAO’s collective authority, not informal decisions made unilaterally or after the fact.

2. On My Voting Record
You’ve brought up multiple times that I didn’t vote on P-014. Let me remind you: the legitimacy of raising governance concerns is not contingent on whether or not someone voted on a proposal. This is a diversionary tactic that doesn’t address the substantive issues at hand. The question isn’t who voted but whether the governance process has been followed properly. For a steward to repeatedly invoke this irrelevant point shows an unwillingness to engage with the real issues and a concerning lack of impartiality.

Moreover, much has changed then, prompting new action. What’s changed? See below.

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This is exactly why self-amending governance exists—to adapt to new realities. The DAO has both the right and responsibility to revisit decisions made under outdated conditions to ensure alignment with present opportunities. Ignoring this risks serious economic missteps.

3. Logical Fallacies in Your Argument
Your argument hinges on several contradictory premises. On one hand, you acknowledge that the execution date wasn’t included in the proposal or voted on by the DAO. On the other hand, you suggest that this date, determined informally, is binding because it’s “part of the plan.” These two claims cannot coexist logically. You cannot simultaneously uphold that DAO votes are sacrosanct while elevating informal decisions made outside the DAO process to binding status. This inconsistency undermines your role as a neutral arbiter of governance.

4. On Immediate Self-Insertion
Once again, you’ve accepted my post with an immediate reply of your own. This pattern—accepting governance issues for discussion only when you simultaneously position yourself to control or reframe them—is not becoming of a Steward of Governance. Your role is to facilitate impartial governance, not to gatekeep discussions or preemptively dismiss dissent.

5. On Adding New Requirements
You mention that you’ve added timeline requirements to the proposal process “today” to prevent issues like this in the future. While this is a positive step for clarity, it does not retroactively justify the mishandling of this situation. Additionally, making unilateral changes to governance processes without formal DAO approval risks setting a dangerous precedent. These processes must be shaped by collective agreement, not individual decisions.

Moving Forward
Your role as Steward of Governance is to serve as a neutral facilitator who upholds transparency, consistency, and fairness in governance processes. To this end, I would encourage you to step back from defensive or dismissive responses and instead focus on ensuring that the DAO’s processes are followed properly—starting with the acknowledgment that informal decisions cannot supersede formal governance. Additionally, governance discussions should not be framed as personal critiques but as collective efforts to improve the DAO’s functionality and ensure its alignment with the community’s best interests.