Social Proposal
Request for Action
Constitution Amendment
Abstract:
This proposal seeks approval to transition the auction format for 2-character (2D) and 1-character (1D) domains under P-014 from Dutch auctions to English (ascending) auctions. This change is critical to maximizing revenue potential, achieving superior price discovery, and allowing speculative value to thrive within the Tezos Domains ecosystem.
English auctions are proven to deliver superior results for high-value and rare assets by enabling open competition among bidders. This format eliminates the risk of prematurely capping pricesâan inherent flaw in Dutch auctions where auctions can close too quickly and fail to capture the full speculative value of these assets. By adopting English auctions, the market determines the final price organically, reflecting true demand and allowing bidders to push prices to their full potential.
With the Tezos ecosystem showing signs of a new bull cycleâmarked by increased activity and public optimismânow is the opportune time to optimize the auction process for these domains. Premium assets like 2D and ultra-scarce 1D domains are uniquely positioned to benefit from the competitive and transparent nature of English auctions. This format aligns with the ecosystemâs momentum, strengthens buyer engagement, and ensures these assets reach their highest possible valuations.
Rationale:
Maximizing Price Discovery:
English auctions allow bidders to openly compete, driving prices upward until the market reaches its full speculative potential. This format captures speculative demand more effectively and ensures that rare assets like 2-character (2D) and 1-character (1D) domains achieve their highest value. The open nature of English auctions is particularly crucial for ultra-scarce assets like 1D domains, where demand may exceed even the highest expectations.
Avoiding Value Caps:
Dutch auctions impose an artificial price ceiling that can leave value untapped. If the starting price is set too high, participation may be limited; if set too low, auctions can end prematurely, cutting off speculative growth. For high-value assets like 2D and 1D domains, this risk is significant. English auctions eliminate this limitation, enabling market forces to determine the final price through transparent and competitive bidding.
Proven Track Record:
English auctions in the ecosystem have already demonstrated strong results. Even less rare domains, such as 5-character names, achieved over 3,000 tez during a prior cycle of higher tez valuation. With their scarcity and desirability, 2D domains (renewal price: 650 tez) and 1D domains (renewal price: 3,000 tez) are well-positioned to deliver even greater returns under the English auction format, particularly in todayâs growing market.
Alignment with the Tezos Bull Cycle:
A new bull cycle for Tezos appears to be underway, marked by increased activity and enthusiasm in the ecosystem. This shift in public sentiment heightens the speculative value of premium assets like 2D and 1D domains. Optimizing the auction format ensures we capitalize on this renewed momentum, allowing these assets to reach their full revenue potential.
Better Buyer Engagement:
English auctions foster a more dynamic and engaging experience for bidders, encouraging broader participation and competition. This heightened excitement benefits the ecosystem by driving higher visibility, increased activity, and stronger market outcomes. The competitive nature of English auctions is particularly effective for drawing high-value bids for 2D domains and the ultra-rare 1D domains, which are among the most coveted assets.
Details:
Auction Mechanics:
English auctions begin with a pre-set reserve price, aligning with the renewal prices established under P-014 (650 tez for 2D domains and 3,000 tez for 1D domains). Participants place bids incrementally, competing openly until no higher bids are submitted. This ensures assets are sold at their highest market-driven value, accurately reflecting demand and speculative interest.
Revenue Optimization:
The open and competitive nature of English auctions maximizes price discovery, allowing high-value and speculative bids to surface organically. Unlike Dutch auctions, which risk premature closures or undervaluation due to fixed price trajectories, English auctions give the market full control to set the final price. This is particularly critical for premium assets like 2D and 1D domains, which hold significant speculative potential.
Community Benefits:
English auctions enhance transparency and fairness by fostering a bidding environment where participants have equal opportunities to compete. This dynamic process creates a more engaging and exciting experience for bidders, encouraging broader participation. Additionally, higher community engagement drives greater visibility and activity, strengthening the ecosystem as a whole.
Specification:
Actions:
Implement Auction Format Change:
Transition the auction format for 2-character (2D) and 1-character (1D) domains under P-014 from Dutch auctions to English (ascending) auctions.
Set Reserve Prices:
For 2D domains, set the starting reserve price at 650 tez, consistent with the renewal price established in P-014.
For 1D domains, set the starting reserve price at 3,000 tez, aligning with their renewal price and reflecting their scarcity and value.
Update Auction Platform Infrastructure:
Adapt the auction platform to support English auctions, including functionality for real-time bidding and incremental price increases.
Conduct testing to ensure seamless user experience and technical stability for both 1D and 2D auctions.
Develop and Execute a Communication Plan:
Notify the community through official channels (forums, social media, and newsletters) about the change to English auctions. Clearly explain the benefits of this auction format, including improved price discovery, transparency, and maximized revenue potential.
Monitor Auction Outcomes:
Track key metrics such as participation rates, bid activity, final prices, and community feedback for both 1D and 2D auctions.
Analyze the results to refine strategies for future premium domain auctions (i.e. including and especially if a stay on 1D is voted to pass)
As P-014 has been accepted as is along with no contest during voting period, you are unable to change this aspect of this proposal. (The Auction Method)
Snorlax, this isnât a conflict; itâs an amendment. The governance process exists to allow us to revisit and refine past decisions when new insights arise. Nothing in the constitution or procedure prohibits proposing adjustments to passed resolutionsâespecially when itâs done through the proper voting process.
Calling this a conflict misrepresents the proposalâs purpose. If the DAO supports it, it passes; if not, it doesnât. Blocking it from a vote undermines the iterative nature of governance.If you believe this violates a specific rule, please point to it directly.
Also, the implementation date of December 3rd was never agreed upon by the DAO. Therefore, the argument that weâre âless than a week fromâ the execution date isnât valid. In fact, weâll likely need another vote to validate whatever date is ultimately decided.
It would be a conflict as itâs an amendment to an already passed proposal.
As for the planned date, it was indirectly accepted by the DAO when it was voted for and accepted with all the specifications and details within the proposal indicating that changes would be coming.
Unfortunately as it stands, this isnât able to be processed.
Snorlax, this reasoning isnât grounded in the Constitution or the governance process. Amendments are not conflicts; theyâre part of iterative governance. The DAOâs framework allows proposals to refine or adjust passed resolutions, provided they follow the process and are brought to a vote. Blocking this amendment without procedural basis undermines that process.
As for the planned date, an âindirect acceptanceâ is not the same as a formally approved execution date. The execution timeline was not explicitly set or voted on by the DAO, and assuming otherwise misrepresents the governance process.
If you believe this proposal violates specific governance rules, I ask again: cite the exact provision. Otherwise, preventing it from moving forward exceeds your authority as Steward and denies the DAO its right to make decisions collectively.
If the DAO accepted already voted for proposal amendments it would be listed somewhere in either the rules or the constitution. Itâs a pretty straightforward process when it comes to proposals and voting in DAOs. The very few DAOs that allow amendments AFTER proposal acceptance have it in their proposal process & rules. We do not.
As SoG Iâm able to amend the rules of the proposal process, I will be updating the rules soon to make things easier for you to understand.
Snorlax, once again, we never voted on an implementation date. By your own words, the date was âinformally decided,â yet you are treating it as authoritative. Using an informal decision as the basis to preclude a vote on amending a previous proposal is a misuse of governance authority.
Governance exists to allow iterative decision-making, and amendments to passed proposals are a natural part of the process. The Constitution does not prohibit amendments, and the absence of an explicit rule allowing them does not give you the authority to block proposals arbitrarily.
If you believe this proposal violates specific governance rules or a provision of the constitution cite the exact provision. Otherwise, this proposal must be allowed to proceed to a vote, as it is up to the DAOânot youâto decide.
Regardless of past practices or whatâs in the current job description, the DAOâs needs have evolved. The Steward of Governance should focus on decentralization and administrative facilitation, not on drafting proposalsâespecially ones that impact governance structures or their own role. The priority must be advancing decentralization, not compounding centralization.
Your response reflects a pattern of deflecting critiques by framing them as âtoo late,â which is irrelevant. A valid concern remains valid regardless of timing. This tendency to dismiss points rather than engage with their merits highlights why you are unsuited for this role. The Stewardâs job is to enable DAO-driven solutions, not act as a legislator or decision-maker.
Iâm sorry, but youâre telling me Iâm not allowed to propose changes to make the DAO more decentralized? Whilst also saying Iâm only able to focus on decentralization and admin? Itâs not deflecting, youâre literally making no sense and contradicting your own comments.
In a DAO, being to late to voting or proposing is a fair comment when youâre trying to change proposals that have already been voted on and accepted.
What I was trying to get at by âtaken this long not to like itâ was because itâs been the job description since the DAO was made, youâre making these point whilst trying to put me out of a job, rather than collaborating and learning from each other, just seems massively counterproductive.
Perhaps if by the 10th none sell, this may be a better alternative to switch to normal auctions starting at 3k XTZ as opposed to just leaving it at 3k.
I feel like that was probably @Primateâs plan anyway tho
The unsold names will be listed for 3000 XTZ on Objkt and a future proposal will be able to do with them as outlined therein. We have just under a year before the unsold names expire and become available again via the auction process on https://app.tezos.domains.
