Companion proposal: DRAFT: Treasury co-funding of Tezos Domains operations, October 2026 – June 2027 — the two are intended to be voted in the same cycle.
Voting period: 7 days
Categories:
Social Proposal
Request for Action
Constitution Amendment
Abstract
Define .tez prices as USD targets — $5 a year for a standard name, rising fourfold per character removed for shorter names — paid in XTZ, and let the treasury signers re-express the XTZ prices whenever the 30-day average XTZ/USD rate has moved more than 25% from the rate at which prices were last set. This replaces the one-directional exchange-rate clause of P-013. Delegates keep the right to block any reset by a 7-day proposal. The change takes effect on execution, and the results are reviewed publicly after 12 months.
Rationale
Every cost of running Tezos Domains is in dollars and every unit of income is in tez at a price fixed years ago, so the real price of a name, and the service’s ability to pay for itself, has followed the XTZ chart rather than any decision of the DAO. A standard name now costs 12% of what it cost at launch. The last price change, a tripling in 2025, moved renewal retention by about one point. Pricing in dollar terms puts both sides of the ledger in the same unit and lets protocol income carry the running costs. Sections 1–8 give the evidence; the Specification gives the actions.
Details
1. Summary
The goal of this proposal is to make Tezos Domains self-sustaining. Protocol income is nowhere near the cost of running the service, and has not been for years:
| Protocol income, last 12 months | 41,296 XTZ |
| Its value at the 90-day average rate of $0.2213 | ~$9,100 |
| Share of the annual cost of running the service that this meets | about 13% |
Income is earned and held in XTZ; nothing has been converted, so the dollar figure is a valuation at today’s rate, not an amount received. That is precisely the problem. Because the costs are billed in dollars and the income arrives in tez, the protocol’s ability to pay for itself moves with the exchange rate rather than with anything about the business:
| If XTZ is worth | the same 41,296 XTZ covers |
|---|---|
| $0.15 | ~9% of the year’s costs |
| $0.2213 (today) | ~13% |
| $0.30 | ~17% |
| $0.40 | ~23% |
Registrations, renewals and costs are identical in every row. Only the exchange rate changes. Domain fees do not cover the infrastructure the domains run on at any of these rates, let alone the engineering that keeps them resolving; the remainder is met by Tezos Foundation grants and by the DAO treasury.
The Tezos Foundation has supported Tezos Domains since 2021 and continues to support it. The direction of that cooperation is clear and has been for some time: the protocol is expected to meet a growing share of its own running costs, and continuing the relationship means moving in that direction rather than standing still. Pricing is the DAO’s principal lever for doing so. This proposal, together with its companion on treasury co-funding, is how the DAO takes that step on its own initiative.
The reason that table moves at all is that almost every cost of running the service is denominated in USD, and none of it is denominated in XTZ. Servers, databases, the email, DNS and networking providers, the community forum, engineering time, the annual entity and administrative costs — all invoiced in dollars. Income is the only side of the ledger quoted in tez. Pricing in USD terms puts both sides in the same unit, so the answer to “does the protocol pay for itself” stops depending on the XTZ chart.
.tez prices are set as a fixed number of XTZ in the registrar contract. The only rule that ties them to the dollar is the “future proofing” clause of P-013 (October 2024, reaffirmed by P-021): it lets the dev team re-express prices to USD anchors if XTZ rises by at least 200% and holds, after a 30-day announcement, with delegates able to block by a 7-day vote. It is one-directional — it provides for cuts when XTZ rises, never for rises when XTZ falls — and it has never been used. Prices have been changed — P-021 tripled the standard price in May 2025 — but they have never been indexed, so between votes the real price simply follows the XTZ chart. §7 replaces the P-013 clause.
The result is that the price has been set by the market rather than by the DAO:
| Price in XTZ | XTZ/USD | A domain costs | |
|---|---|---|---|
| May 2021 (first full month of operation) | 1 | $5.12 | $5.12 / year |
| April 2025 (eve of P-021) | 1 | $0.557 | $0.56 / year |
| May 2025 (P-021 executed) | 3 | $0.613 | $1.84 / year |
| August 2026 | 3 | $0.210 | $0.63 / year |
(monthly average XTZ/USD in each case. Elsewhere in this proposal USD figures use the 90-day average, $0.2213, as a valuation convention; the §7 rule itself works on the 30-day average.)
Two erosions, neither of them decided by anyone: 89% over the four years to April 2025, and then 66% in the 15 months since — the tripling has already been almost entirely given back. A standard .tez name today costs $0.63 per year, 12% of what it cost at launch. ENS charges $5. .com charges $10–15.
The proposed answer is $5 per year for a standard name. That figure is not ambitious and it is not novel: it is what .tez itself cost at launch ($5.12), exactly what ENS charges for the equivalent name, and a third to a half of what a .com costs. It will not make the protocol self-funding — §6 is explicit that pricing alone cannot do that — but it moves the service from covering roughly an eighth of its costs to covering the whole of its running costs, which is the part any protocol can reasonably be expected to carry itself. The remainder stays with the Tezos Foundation, subject to its approval each period.
This proposal does two things.
First, it restates .tez prices as USD targets, paid in XTZ, keeping the fourfold step per character that the current ladder already has and anchoring it to $5:
| Name length | Price today | Proposed target | Indicative XTZ |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 character | 800 XTZ ($177) | $1,280 / year | 5,800 XTZ |
| 2 characters | 200 XTZ ($44) | $320 / year | 1,450 XTZ |
| 3 characters | 50 XTZ ($11.06) | $80 / year | 360 XTZ |
| 4 characters | 12 XTZ ($2.66) | $20 / year | 90 XTZ |
| 5+ characters | 3 XTZ ($0.66) | $5 / year | 23 XTZ |
(indicative XTZ figures at $0.2213, rounded to a round number within 2% of the target; the values actually set are recomputed at the 30-day average on the day of execution)
Second, it adds an optional, rate-triggered reset. Whenever the 30-day average XTZ/USD rate is more than ±25% away from the rate at which prices were last set, the treasury signers may re-express the XTZ prices at the USD targets. No fixed calendar and no minimum interval; no obligation to act; and the discretion is capped — it can only restate the targets in this proposal, never change them. §7 sets out the parameters and why they were chosen.
Expected effect: protocol income of roughly $35,500/year in the central case, against $9,100 today — cost coverage rising from about an eighth to about half, with the entire non-engineering part of the cost base — infrastructure, community programs and administrative costs — covered outright. That is not full self-sufficiency, and §6 is explicit that pricing alone cannot get there. It is the difference between a protocol that needs a grant to exist and one that needs a grant only for engineering.
Roughly 31% of that projected income — a little over a quarter of the uplift over today — comes from the short-name tiers. The case for repricing them specifically is set out in §5 (in the first reply below, with original numbering), because it is the part of this proposal with the least prior discussion.
2. Where the money actually comes from
Measured from the registrar’s own buy and renew operations, trailing 12 months (1 September 2025 – 31 August 2026):
| Length | Purchases | Renewals | Actions | XTZ | ≈ USD @ $0.2213 | Share of income |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 char | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $0 | 0.0% |
| 2 char | 3 | 0 | 3 | 1,400 | $310 | 3.4% |
| 3 char | 13 | 51 | 64 | 7,100 | $1,571 | 17.2% |
| 4 char | 94 | 226 | 320 | 8,496 | $1,880 | 20.6% |
| 5+ char | 1,139 | 2,628 | 3,767 | 24,300 | $5,378 | 58.8% |
| Total | 1,249 | 2,905 | 4,154 | 41,296 | $9,139 |
(The treasury received 42,133 XTZ from the registrar over the same window; the 2% difference is auction proceeds and sweep timing.)
Short names — four characters or fewer — are 9.3% of all activity but 41.2% of all income. They are the high-value tail of a small business, and they are currently priced at $2.66 and $11.06 a year. Any repricing that leaves them out gives away more than a quarter of its own effect.
The installed base by name length (names ever registered, active today, expiring within 12 months) is in the first reply, with §5.
3. What the last price change actually did
P-021 (May 2025) changed three things at once: it tripled the standard price (1 → 3 XTZ) and it halved the short-name prices (3-char 100 → 50 XTZ, 4-char 25 → 12 XTZ). It also opened 1- and 2-character names at 800 and 200 XTZ.
Comparing the 12 months before the change with the 12 months after (all buy + renew actions):
| Length | Price change | Actions before | Actions after | Δ actions | XTZ before | XTZ after | Δ income |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 char | ÷2 | 71 | 83 | +17% | 7,500 | 8,300 | +11% |
| 4 char | ÷2 | 305 | 397 | +30% | 10,325 | 9,984 | −3% |
| 5+ char | ×3 | 13,550 | 4,626 | −66% | 27,005 | 25,734 | −5% |
| All | 13,926 | 5,110 | −63% | 44,830 | 45,618 | +2% |
(The All row also includes 2-character names, opened by P-021 and too few for a row of their own: 4 actions and 1,600 XTZ in the after period.)
Two findings, and they point the same way.
Finding 1 — tripling the standard price did not visibly cost volume. The −66% looks alarming until it is put against the pre-existing trend. Annual purchases of 5+ character names, with no price change at all until May 2025:
| Year | 5+ char purchases | Change |
|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 75,945 | |
| 2023 | 17,933 | −76% |
| 2024 | 4,112 | −77% |
| 2025 | 1,857 | −55% |
| 2026 (annualized) | ~1,150 | −38% |
The decline was running at 55–77% per year before the price rose. A −66% year after tripling the price is inside that band, not outside it. What the price change did was convert a collapsing action count into flat revenue — without it, income would have fallen by roughly 60%. The DAO subsequently rejected P-024, which sought to restore 1-XTZ pricing.
Finding 2 — halving short-name prices bought very little volume. Cutting the 3-character price in half produced +17% more activity; cutting the 4-character price in half produced +30%. Neither came close to the +100% needed to hold income flat, and 4-character income fell outright. Demand for short names is inelastic: the price is what determines the revenue, not the volume.
That finding cuts in the other direction now. If halving the price barely moved volume, raising it should raise income close to proportionally.
4. Controlling for the ecosystem: was it the price, or was it Tezos?
The tables in §3 count transactions, and transaction counts fall when a chain loses users regardless of what anything costs. Before drawing conclusions about elasticity, the price effect has to be separated from the ecosystem effect. Three tests, from most to least direct; the ones not shown here are in the replies below, with their original numbering.
4.1 Renewal retention — the test that is already normalized
Renewal rate is a ratio: of the names that reached expiry in a given period, what share was renewed within 90 days. A shrinking user base moves the numerator and the denominator together, so this measures price response with the ecosystem trend already divided out. Because renewals are strongly seasonal — the large 2021–22 registration cohorts cluster in May and June — cohorts are matched month-for-month across years.
5+ character names (price 1 → 3 XTZ on 13 May 2025):
| Expiry cohort | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| January–April | 20.0% (27,424) | 26.0% (13,210) | 24.7% (7,481) | 24.8% (3,791) |
| May–August | 52.8% (16,837) | 45.2% (11,859) | 46.5% (7,366) | — |
(counts in italics are names reaching expiry in that cohort)
The May–August 2025 cohort is the first that had to renew at 3 XTZ rather than 1 XTZ. It renewed at 46.5%, against 45.2% for the same months a year earlier. The January–April 2026 cohort, entirely at the new price, renewed at 24.8% against 24.7% the year before.
Tripling the renewal price moved retention by about one percentage point, upward, in both cohorts. This is the strongest single result in the analysis, and it is the one that cannot be explained away by the chain losing users.
Short names (≤4 characters), same cohorts, where the price was halved:
| Expiry cohort | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| January–April | 34.2% (386) | 37.0% (327) | 32.9% (173) | 44.6% (83) |
| May–August | 45.7% (505) | 25.8% (298) | 33.6% (122) | — |
Here the price change did register: halving lifted retention by roughly 8–12 percentage points. Short-name holders are meaningfully more price-sensitive than standard-name holders — which is why the retention assumptions applied to the short tiers in §6 are set well below those for the base tier. The samples are small (83 and 122 names) and should be read as a direction, not a coefficient.
4.4 What this changes
The conclusion in §3 stands, and stands on firmer ground: the −66% action drop after P-021 is an ecosystem effect, not a price effect. Retention moved by about a point, upward, through a 3× increase, and user attrition stayed inside the range the ecosystem lost anyway.
Two qualifications, stated because they cut against the proposal:
- The finding is about 3×, not about 7.5×. Nothing here demonstrates what happens at $5. It demonstrates that this user base did not flinch at a tripling, which is why the base-tier retention assumptions in §6 are set at 40–75% rather than at the ~100% the evidence would literally support.
- Short-name holders behave differently. They responded visibly to a halving, so they will respond to an increase. §6 prices that in.
A third point is worth stating for the DAO’s own planning, separately from this proposal: the ecosystem is shrinking faster than any price increase can compensate for. Repricing raises income per name against a base that is contracting 35–45% a year. It buys two to three years, not permanence. New demand — which for Tezos Domains means reaching users beyond the current L1 base — is a separate problem and is not solved here.
6. What this is expected to produce
Projected annual protocol income, applying each tier’s price multiple to its trailing-12-month income and then a retention assumption for the volume that stays:
| Scenario | Retention assumed | 5+ char | 4 char | 3 char | 2 char | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pessimistic | 40% of 5+ actions, 25% of short | $16,300 | $3,500 | $2,800 | $600 | $23,200 |
| Central | 60% of 5+, 40% of short | $24,400 | $5,700 | $4,500 | $900 | $35,500 |
| Optimistic | 75% of 5+, 60% of short | $30,600 | $8,500 | $6,800 | $1,400 | $47,300 |
| Today | $5,400 | $1,900 | $1,600 | $300 | $9,100 |
Single-character names are excluded from all three scenarios; any income from them is upside.
These retention assumptions are deliberately more pessimistic than the evidence in §3 and §4, which showed a 3× price rise moving renewal retention by about one percentage point, upward and costing no more users than the ecosystem lost anyway. Taken literally, that evidence would justify assuming 90%+ retention at the base tier. It is not taken literally: the proposed multiple, about 7.5× on every tier, is far outside the range anyone has observed, and extrapolation that far is not evidence. The short tiers are given lower retention than the base tier because §4.1 found short-name holders are measurably price-responsive, unlike standard-name holders.
Costs were reduced first. Before any of this was proposed, infrastructure spending for 2026/27 was cut 48% against the previous year, with the server footprint down about 64% — own RPC nodes retired in favour of Foundation-provided endpoints, testnet and Etherlink environments shut down, and the remainder consolidated. Full-time staffing was replaced with hourly maintenance over the same period. What follows is measured against the cost base that remains after all of that.
Against the cost base. Roughly a third of the annual cost of running Tezos Domains is everything other than engineering — infrastructure and third-party services, entity and administrative costs, and the community programs paid in XTZ. The central case covers that non-engineering third in full and contributes meaningfully to engineering as well, taking total coverage to about half, against an eighth today.
On the goal of self-sustainability. This is the step that gets most of the way, not the whole way, and the proposal should not be sold as if it were the whole way. Closing the remaining gap through pricing alone would mean something like $13/year for a standard name — more than ENS, on a much smaller ecosystem — and the response measured at 3× cannot be extrapolated that far. What this proposal does is put the protocol’s running costs permanently on protocol income, and reduce the outside ask to the engineering that no naming protocol at this scale funds commercially. The remaining routes to closing the gap are a smaller engineering footprint, a smaller community budget, or new demand — and only the last of those grows the protocol rather than shrinking it. Each is a separate decision for the DAO; none of them is possible at all while the protocol earns an eighth of its costs.
7. The optional rate-triggered reset
Fixed XTZ prices are the root cause of the problem this proposal fixes. Setting new fixed XTZ prices and stopping there would just restart the same erosion — §1 shows it took 15 months to give back the whole of P-021’s tripling.
Why USD and not XTZ. The cost side of this protocol is denominated in USD almost in its entirety: servers, databases, the email, DNS and networking providers, the community forum, engineering time, and the annual entity and administrative costs. The only XTZ-denominated cost is the community programs, 25,200 XTZ/year — under a tenth of the total. Everything else is invoiced in dollars and does not become cheaper when XTZ falls. Pricing the product in the same unit as the costs is what makes “does the protocol pay for itself” a question with a stable answer.
Proposed rule. Prices are defined as the USD targets in §1. There is no review calendar and no minimum interval. Instead:
Whenever the 30-day average XTZ/USD rate differs by more than ±25% from the rate at which prices were last set, the treasury signers may re-express the XTZ prices at the USD targets, using the 30-day average on the day of execution, and publish the rate used. They are never obliged to.
Why these parameters. They were chosen by replaying each candidate over the XTZ price history since the registrar opened (May 2021 – September 2026) and scoring two things: how much of the target USD income the rule would have earned, and how often holders would have been paying well over target because XTZ rose while the XTZ price stayed fixed. In the replay each reset is assumed to execute three days after its trigger; in practice the delay is whatever the keyholders’ signatures take.
| Averaging window | Band | Minimum interval | Resets per year | Income earned, share of target | Days holders paid >20% over target | Longest such stretch |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 90-day | ±25% | 6 months | 1.7 | 0.87–0.96 | 17–23% | 84–137 days |
| 90-day | ±25% | 3 months | 3.4 | 0.89 | 17% | 73 days |
| 30-day | ±25% | 6 months | 1.9 | 0.91 | 18% | 119 days |
| 30-day | ±25% | none | 4.3 | 0.92 | 7% | 23 days |
| 30-day | ±20% | none | 6.2 | 0.95 | 10% | 24 days |
| 7-day | ±20% | none | 7.3 | 0.96 | 5% | 10 days |
| Spot | ±25% | none | 8.6 | 0.96 | 4% | 5 days |
- No minimum interval. A minimum interval was considered and rejected, because it is what does the damage on both sides. With a six-month lock, holders would have paid more than twice the target for three to four months in early 2024 and again in late 2024, because the lock blocked a cut; and the protocol would have earned 40–60% of target for six months in 2022, because the lock blocked a rise. Removing the interval halves the income shortfall and shortens the overcharge stretches from months to weeks. The band, not a calendar, limits how often the rule fires: about four times a year in a market like the last five (6, 5, 1, 6, 3 and 2 times in the years since 2021), fewer in a calm one.
- 30-day average, not spot. XTZ moves 25% on noise. A 30-day average crosses the band when the level has moved, not when a single day prints an outlier, and it removes any ability to time the trigger to a spike. A 7-day average or spot would track the targets more closely still, at roughly twice the number of resets; the 30-day average is the compromise between tracking and operational load.
- ±25%, as opposed to a tighter band. Below 25% the trigger fires on ordinary volatility. Above it, the corrections become large and jarring when they do arrive; a holder would rather see 25% than 60%.
Three limits on the discretion, so this is a narrow mandate rather than an open one:
- It is permissive, not automatic. Nothing obliges a reset. If a move looks like it will reverse, or the timing is poor, the signers can leave prices where they are.
- It only re-expresses; it cannot revalue. The signers may set the XTZ price that corresponds to $5, $20, $80, $320 or $1,280. Changing any of those figures requires a new proposal and a new vote.
- It is symmetric. The rule cuts the XTZ price when XTZ appreciates past the band, on exactly the same terms and with the same promptness as it raises it when XTZ falls. This is not a mechanism for raising prices; it is a mechanism for holding them still in real terms.
Each exercise is reported: date, 30-day average used, old and new XTZ prices per tier. The rate used is the 30-day average on the day the multisig proposal is created, and it becomes the reference for the next trigger. If the DAO is unhappy with how the discretion is being used, it can revoke it with a proposal at any time.
For illustration: if prices are set at a 30-day average of $0.30, no reset is available until that average moves outside $0.225–$0.375.
Relationship to P-013. This rule replaces the P-013 future-proofing clause in full: the USD targets in §1 replace P-013’s anchors, and the ±25% trigger replaces the 200%-rise trigger. Two elements of P-013 are treated differently, and the DAO should approve both explicitly:
- The delegate block is kept. Any reset under this rule may be blocked by a 7-day proposal brought by a delegate, passed by simple majority with quorum, exactly as P-013 provided. Since resets are permissive, a block simply leaves prices where they are.
- The 30-day notice is dropped. P-013 required a 30-day announcement before a change, P-016 and P-021 both specified a 30-day notice, and P-021 was executed that way. That is workable for a rule that fires once in years and only cuts prices. It is not workable for a symmetric rule that may fire a few times a year, and for a price rise it is harmful: the registrar has no maximum registration duration, so a 30-day window before a rise is an invitation to lock in decades at the old price (§8). Resets take effect when the multisig operation resolves; no date is announced beforehand, and the report above is published once it has. Cuts, where no such problem exists, may be announced ahead of execution at the signers’ discretion.
Income is still received in XTZ, so its USD value still depends on when it is converted. The rule removes the exposure in the price, not in the holding.
8. Risks and how they are handled
The reset is optional, so it never happens. The obvious cost of making it permissive rather than automatic: discretion that is never exercised is the same as no rule at all, and the erosion in §1 resumes. The reason to accept that risk is that an automatic rule is worse in the other direction — it would fire on a move that then reverses, force a price change at a moment nobody chose, and leave the DAO no way to decline. The counterweights are procedural: the trigger condition is objective and anyone can check it against public price data, every reset is published with the rate used, and a signer group that lets prices erode while asking the DAO for treasury conversions will have to account for it.
Volume falls further than modelled. The main risk. Mitigation is the honesty of the three scenarios above: even the pessimistic case ($23,200) is 2.5× today’s income. For repricing to leave the DAO worse off, retention would have to fall below roughly 13% of current volume — well below the worst year on record, when 5+ purchases fell to 23% of the year before.
Renewal shock on existing short-name holders. 210 four-character and 39 three-character names come up for renewal within 12 months, at about 7.5× their current price. Some will lapse. This is priced into the retention assumptions, and lapsed short names return to the available pool at the new price rather than disappearing. There is no proposal to grandfather existing registrations: it would be complex, it would cost most of the first year’s benefit, and ENS did not do it either.
Registrations at the old price during the voting window. The registrar sets no maximum registration duration — in the last 12 months, 86 registrations were for 10 years, 19 for 20 years and 8 for 50 years, and 23% of all actions were for 3 years or more. Because the vote is public, holders can lock in years at the current price before the change takes effect. A holder renewing 10 years at 3 XTZ pays ~$6 today and avoids ~$50 of future price.
This is, deliberately, the grace period. Anyone who values a name can renew it at today’s price between the posting of this proposal and its execution. No execution date is announced. It is also the reason this proposal departs from the 30-day notice that P-016 and P-021 specified, and from P-013’s 30-day announcement (§7): every additional week of notice is a week of discounted forward sales, and the voting period is already the notice.
Three consequences follow, and the DAO should decide on them explicitly:
- The change takes effect on execution — no further grace period beyond the voting window, no announced future effective date.
- Keep the voting window short. Every extra week is a week of discounted forward sales.
- A maximum registration duration is worth introducing, but the current contract configuration has no such key, so it is a code change and belongs in its own proposal rather than being bolted onto this one.
The exposure is bounded: 24,920 names are active, and even a heavy pull-forward is a one-off transfer of future income into the present at old prices, not a permanent loss of the base.
XTZ appreciates sharply and the XTZ price becomes punitive. Handled by the §7 trigger, which is symmetric and has no minimum interval: it cuts the XTZ price on the same terms, and as promptly, as it raises it. Because the reset is permissive rather than automatic, this is the case where the DAO should expect the signers to actually use it — and can hold them to it, since the trigger condition is publicly checkable and every reset is reported.
Reputational. A 7.5× increase on every tier will read badly to some holders. The counter-argument is on the record and should be made openly: this is a restoration, not an increase. The price has not risen in real terms since 2021 — it has fallen 88% — and what is being proposed still leaves .tez at or below ENS at every tier. It is also not the first lever pulled: infrastructure spending was cut 48% this year and staffing moved to hourly before any price change was put to the DAO. The purpose is to put the protocol’s running costs on protocol income, which is what keeps the service durable independently of any single funding source.
Review after 12 months. Twelve months after execution the team will publish, on the forum, the same measurements this proposal is built on — income by tier, renewal retention by tier and expiry cohort, and the paying-user count against the ecosystem comparators — so that the DAO can judge the change on data rather than prediction. If the results warrant a change to the targets, that is a new proposal.
Existing obligations. The affiliate programme (P-023) is unaffected: rewards continue to be computed as 5% of the XTZ paid on referred registrations and renewals. The conditions P-021 attached to the last price change (no market making, no discretionary feature budget) are unaffected. The DAO’s rejection of P-024, which sought to restore 1 XTZ pricing, stands.
Specification
- Adopt the USD price targets in §1: $5 (5+ characters), $20 (4), $80 (3), $320 (2), $1,280 (1) per year, paid in XTZ.
- Keyholders execute a treasury multisig proposal calling
admin_updateon the TLD registrarKT1Mqx5meQbhufngJnUAGEGpa4ZRxhPSiCgBwith the fiveconfigvalues of §9, computed at the 30-day average XTZ/USD rate on the day the multisig proposal is created. The change takes effect on resolution. - Grant the treasury signers the permissive reset described in §7: whenever the 30-day average differs by more than ±25% from the rate last used, they may re-express the XTZ prices at the USD targets, publishing the rate and the old and new values the same day. Delegates may block any reset by a 7-day proposal. Changing a USD target requires a new proposal.
- Publish the review described in §8 twelve months after execution.
- Adds: the USD targets and the reset rule. Replaces: the P-013 future-proofing clause (USD anchors, 200%-rise trigger, 30-day announcement); the P-021 price structure. Ends: the 30-day notice practice of P-016/P-021 for price changes under this rule. P-023 unchanged.
10. Vote
- For — adopt the USD price targets in §1 for all five length tiers, and grant the treasury signers the optional rate-triggered reset described in §7.
- Against — leave prices as they are.
- Abstain
Proposal Passing Requirement (Request for action): 50%+ Yes votes, 10%+ TEDv quorum
The sections that do not fit Discourse’s post length limit follow in the first reply, with their original numbering: §4.3 chain-wide activity, §9 implementation, appendix, §5 short-name price evidence, §4.2 users lost vs comparators.
Vote on P-026: Tezos Homebase
Vote Ends: 06 October 2026 at 13:30 GMTProposal Passing Requirement (Request for action): 50%+ Yes votes, 10%+ TEDv quorum
